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Wednesday, September 30

  1. page Ehrlich v. Culver City edited <i><a class="wiki_link_ext" href="http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?…
    <i><a class="wiki_link_ext" href="http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal4th/12/854.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">EhrlichEhrlich v. City
    ...
    Supreme Court (1996)</a></i><br>
    <br>
    Facts:<br>
    (1996)
    Facts:

    The plaintiff
    ...
    to the city.<br>
    <br>
    city.
    Following several
    ...
    addition, a $30,000<br>$30,000
    parkland fee
    ...
    then developed. <br>
    <br>
    Procedure:<br>

    Procedure:

    A petition
    ...
    was deemed constitutional.<br>
    <br>
    constitutional.
    The Court
    ...
    art fee. <br>
    <br>
    Plaintiff

    Plaintiff
    then sought
    ...
    by the project.<br>
    <br>
    project.
    Issue: <br>
    Is

    Is
    the imposition
    ...
    permit approval? <br>
    <br>
    Holding:<br>

    Holding:

    The Court
    ...
    constitutional and valid.<br>
    <br>
    Rationale:<br>
    valid.
    Rationale:

    The court
    ...
    without payment” (pg.17).<br>
    <br>
    (pg.17).
    This also
    ...
    could not satisfy.<br>
    <br>
    satisfy.
    The art
    ...
    (pg. 19). &nbsp;
    (view changes)
    10:25 pm
  2. page Ehrlich v. Culver City edited Ehrlich <i><a class="wiki_link_ext" href="http://login.findlaw.com/script…
    Ehrlich<i><a class="wiki_link_ext" href="http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal4th/12/854.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Ehrlich v. City
    ...
    Supreme Court (1996)
    Facts:
    (1996)</a></i><br>
    <br>
    Facts:<br>

    The plaintiff
    ...
    to the city.city.<br>
    <br>

    Following several
    ...
    addition, a $30,000$30,000<br>
    parkland fee
    ...
    then developed.
    Procedure:
    <br>
    <br>
    Procedure:<br>

    A petition
    ...
    was deemed constitutional.constitutional.<br>
    <br>

    The Court
    ...
    art fee.
    Plaintiff
    <br>
    <br>
    Plaintiff
    then sought
    ...
    by the project.project.<br>
    <br>

    Issue:
    Is
    <br>
    Is
    the imposition
    ...
    permit approval?
    Holding:
    <br>
    <br>
    Holding:<br>

    The Court
    ...
    constitutional and valid.
    Rationale:
    valid.<br>
    <br>
    Rationale:<br>

    The court
    ...
    without payment” (pg.17).(pg.17).<br>
    <br>

    This also
    ...
    could not satisfy.satisfy.<br>
    <br>

    The art
    ...
    (pg. 19). &nbsp;
    (view changes)
    10:24 pm
  3. page Ehrlich v. Culver City edited //Ehrlich Ehrlich v. City ... Supreme Court (1996)// (1996) Facts: The plaintiff acquired …
    //EhrlichEhrlich v. City
    ...
    Supreme Court (1996)//(1996)
    Facts:
    The plaintiff acquired a 2.4-acre lot on Overland Ave in Culver City between 1973 and 1975. City approval was given to develop the site as a private tennis club and rec facility. At the plaintiff’s request, the City amended its zoning and general plan ordinances governing uses on the property from a split zone R-1 (Single Family Residential) and C-2 (retail commercial) to C-3 (commercial). A specific plan was also adopted providing for the development of this private sports club. In 1974, the City recognized “the need for additional tennis facilities in this city is a real one” (pg. 3). The planning commission recommended approval. From 1975 to 1988, the sports complex remained in operation with a swimming pool, five tennis courts, racquetball courts, and weight training and aerobic facilities. In 1981, in response to financial losses, the plaintiff applied for a change in land use in order to construct an office building, which was abandoned after its recommended rejection by the city planning commission. The club closed in August of 1988 due to financial troubles. In September, the plaintiff applied for an amendment to the general plan, a zoning change, and amendment of the specific plan to allow construction of a 30-unit condominium complex valued at $10 million. Shortly thereafter, the City expressed interest in buying the property as a municipally owned sports complex because it felt it was deficient in municipal recreation facilities, but later reported that they lacked the funds. In April 1989, the city council disapproved plaintiff’s application based on concerns over the loss of a recreational land use needed by the community. In the meantime, plaintiff acquired a demolition permit and tore down the existing site improvements, donating the still-useful equipment to the city.
    (view changes)
    10:23 pm
  4. page Ehrlich v. Culver City edited Facts: The //Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, California Supreme Court (1996)// Facts: The p…
    Facts:
    The
    //Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, California Supreme Court (1996)//
    Facts:
    The
    plaintiff acquired
    ...
    the city.
    Following

    Following
    several meetings
    ...
    a $30,000
    parkland fee was paid to the City, and has gone unchallenged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed formal written protests to the imposition of both fees, later alleging that the imposition of the fees amounted to an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. The plaintiff later agreed to pay the $280,000 recreation fee in return for the building and grading permits. The site was then developed.
    Procedure:
    A

    A
    petition for
    ...
    deemed constitutional.
    The Court of Appeal initially affirmed the trial court judgment in its entirety, but on rehearing, modified its opinion to reverse that portion of the judgment invalidating the $280,000 Recreation Fee. The Court of Appeal found there was a "substantial nexus" between the proposed condominium project and the $280,000 exaction. Thus, the Recreation Fee was not, in the Court of Appeal's judgment, an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. The Court of Appeal also upheld the art fee.
    ...
    the project.
    Issue:

    Issue:

    Is the imposition of fees as a condition of the approval of rezoning a property an unconstitutional taking without just compensation? Do the tests formulated in relation to the Dolan and Nollan cases for determining whether a compensable regulatory taking has occurred under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, “substantial nexus” and “rough proportionality”, apply to monetary exaction or only to cases that involve the dedication of real property to public use as a condition of permit approval?
    Holding:
    The

    The
    Court of
    ...
    and valid.
    Rationale:
    The

    Rationale:
    The
    court found
    ...
    payment” (pg.17).
    This

    This
    also falls
    ...
    not satisfy.
    The art in public places fee is not a development exaction of the kind subject to the Nollan-Dolan takings analysis. The requirement to provide an in-lieu fee or art is more akin to traditional land-use regulations. Such aesthetic conditions have long been held to be valid exercises of the city’s traditional police power, and are not takings (pg. 19).
    (view changes)
    10:22 pm
  5. page Kelo v NewLondon edited ... In Ruckelshaus v. Montasanto, Co. (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the EPA could cons…
    ...
    In Ruckelshaus v. Montasanto, Co. (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the EPA could consider data & trade secrets of prior pesticide applicants when evaluating subsequent applications as long as the new applicant paid just compensation for the data. Here the public purpose is to enhance competition and spare applicants the time-consuming research. (!)
    Dissent suggests that Berman and Midkiff differed because each taking directly achieved a public benefit so it didn't matter that the property was turned over to private use; eliminating the property was necessary to remedy the harms (blight resulting from extreme poverty and oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth, respectively). Here, the petitioners well-maintained properties are not the source of any social harm.
    Also, second to last paragraph of the Dissent ("Any property may now be taken...") is well put.
    Also, for kicks, here's a dramatic video! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4N1svadJQ40
    (view changes)
    10:16 pm
  6. page Kelo v NewLondon edited ... In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Berman's defe…
    ...
    In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Berman's deferential approach to legislative judgements in this field, and affirmed a Hawaii statute which transferred titles from lessors to lessees (for just compensation) in order to eliminate the "social and economic evils of a land oligopoly."
    In Ruckelshaus v. Montasanto, Co. (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the EPA could consider data & trade secrets of prior pesticide applicants when evaluating subsequent applications as long as the new applicant paid just compensation for the data. Here the public purpose is to enhance competition and spare applicants the time-consuming research. (!)
    Dissent suggests that Berman and Midkiff differed because each taking directly achieved a public benefit so it didn't matter that the property was turned over to private use; eliminating the property was necessary to remedy the harms (blight resulting from extreme poverty and oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth, respectively). Here, the petitioners well-maintained properties are not the source of any social harm.
    Also, for kicks, here's a dramatic video! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4N1svadJQ40
    (view changes)
    10:11 pm
  7. page Kelo v NewLondon edited ... Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. Ther…
    ...
    Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is no basis for exempting economic development from the court's traditionally broad understanding of public purpose. Even though some private parties may receive more benefits than others here, "We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects."
    What about the likelihood the public purpose won't be achieved? "A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such plans." (Ouch though, since the land is still undeveloped it appears...)
    On the potential for abuse or a veiled giveaway to a private party: "The identity of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans. The city complied with elaborate procedure requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city's purposes."
    Notes:
    Precedents cited:
    (view changes)
    10:05 pm
  8. page Kelo v NewLondon edited ... The "use by the public" is a difficult test to administer (what proportion of the pu…
    ...
    The "use by the public" is a difficult test to administer (what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?) so the interpretation of public use has evolved into the broader understanding of "public purpose" since 1906. The court cited several precedents to show that they deferred to legislative judgements on what constitutes a valid public purpose: "For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power."
    Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is no basis for exempting economic development from the court's traditionally broad understanding of public purpose. Even though some private parties may receive more benefits than others here, "We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects."
    ...
    such plans." (Ouch though, since the land is still undeveloped it appears...)
    Notes:
    Precedents cited:
    (view changes)
    9:10 pm
  9. page Kelo v NewLondon edited ... The "use by the public" is a difficult test to administer (what proportion of the pu…
    ...
    The "use by the public" is a difficult test to administer (what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?) so the interpretation of public use has evolved into the broader understanding of "public purpose" since 1906. The court cited several precedents to show that they deferred to legislative judgements on what constitutes a valid public purpose: "For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power."
    Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is no basis for exempting economic development from the court's traditionally broad understanding of public purpose. Even though some private parties may receive more benefits than others here, "We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects."
    What about the likelihood the public purpose won't be achieved? "A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such plans."
    Notes:
    Precedents cited:
    (view changes)
    9:10 pm

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